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Abstract  
In this brief primer on the emergent field of cognitive literary criticism, I aim to offer a 
tentative outline of its more representative lines of research after roughly twenty to 
twenty five years of activity. One of my main concerns will be to attend to some of the 
main objections that the field has been charged with in its short life, and to highlight the 
ways in which cognitive critics have addressed such objections. After a brief sketch of 
the main fields of activity, I will consider some of the possible future directions, with a 
focus on the different ways in which cognitive critics have embraced enactive approach-
es to embodied and embedded cognition. 
 
 
All turns generate anxiety – left turns, right turns, and especially U-turns 
do. In the field of literary driving, the “cognitive turn” seems to generate 
more anxiety than would be advisable for road safety. Literary and cultural 
critics are nervous: this turn seems to lead to a too eclectic and at the same 
time too reductive a road. Ever since the cognitive turn started, roughly in 
the last two decades, practitioners in the field have been repeatedly ticketed 
for a number of infractions1. Cognitive approaches are seen, at best, as little 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The main charges were raised by Hans Adler and Sabine Gross in their response to a  
special issue of “Poetics Today” on “Literature and the Cognitive Revolution” (vol. 23, 
no. 1). See Adler and Gross, Adjusting the Frame: Comments on Cognitivism and Literature, 
“Poetics Today”, 23, 2, 2002, pp. 195-220. For a pointed, though constructive, critique 
of interdisciplinarity in cognitive literary studies, see Tony Jackson, Issues and Problems in 
the Blending of Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, and Literary Study, “Poetics Today”, 
23, 1, 2002, pp. 161-179. For a recent brief overview of the most frequent objections 
see Lars Bernaerts, Dirk de Geest, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck, Introduction. Cognitive 
Narrative Studies: Themes and Variations, in Bernaerts, de Geest, Herman and Vervaeck 
(eds.), Stories and Minds, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2013, pp. 1-20.	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more than confirming previous critical readings, and hence, useless. The 
field is also seen as too undisciplined: scholars coming from different 
routes are seen to be drawing on too diverse notions, hypotheses and tools 
from the cognitive sciences quite promiscuously and at their best conven-
ience. The purported interdisciplinarity of the field doesn’t seem to be an 
argument convincing enough to tie together a set of loosely related critical 
practices. But by far, nervousness is palpable in the much more passionate 
charge of reductionism and positivism, more so after the more recent “neu-
roscientific turn.” The fear is that literary expression be reduced to its cog-
nitive dimensions – or worse, to neural circuits in the brain. Cognitive liter-
ary criticism is seen as privileging nature over culture, scientific empiricism 
over historicism and cultural theory, thereby adding an unwelcome note of 
disambiguation to a field that values the undecidability and indeterminacy 
of cultural artifacts. 
Of course, one might argue, some degree of nervousness is neither a 
new nor a unique phenomenon. Every new paradigm – the “Marxist turn,” 
the “psychoanalytic turn,” etc. – has generated its own kind of anxiety. On-
ly, in this case the anxiety seems somewhat stronger: the road sign “cogni-
tive” seems to be way more intimidating to learner’s permits and expert 
drivers alike. Why? Is this turn different from previous ones? Is it because 
the humanities and the cognitive sciences are felt to be two too distant 
fields of knowledge? Encountering such expressions as “proprioception”, 
“prefrontal cortex”, or “fMRI” in a piece of literary criticism may be unset-
tling, no doubt, but the real risk, some argue, is not merely terminological. 
Should we be afraid that by turning onto the cognitive junction we are 
bound to leave the Humanities road for good – that we are leaving the tor-
tuous highroad of difference for the straight motorway of universals? 
At the same time, though, the field is in continuous expansion. The last 
two decades have witnessed an increasing number of publications – articles, 
monographs, edited collections and special issues in specialized journals –
 as well as dedicated websites, conferences, joint programs and discussion 
groups with institutional support. Such a trafficked road may of course fur-
ther increase anxiety, but it certainly bolsters interest and curiosity too: 
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where can all these people be going? Do they know their way? Is the road 
safe? And, where does it lead? 
In what follows, I will try to show that this road is not necessarily as 
unwelcoming as it may seem at first sight. I will analyze the main reasons 
for anxiety, and the different ways in which such anxiety has been ad-
dressed by the most careful drivers of the field, as well as the most promis-
ing future directions of the cognitive road. 
 
 
1. Cognitive Turn and Cognitive Revolution(s): From Computational to Embodied 
Minds  
 
Part of this anxiety, understandably enough, comes from the very modi-
fier of the turn. As opposed to, say, “Marxist”, “feminist”, or “psychoana-
lytical”, the term “cognitive” itself provides too little (or, too «vague, broad 
and unstable»)2 information about the road we are merging onto. As a re-
sult, coming up with a working definition of cognitive literary criticism 
seems a strenuous task. Consider Alan Richardson’s proposed formulation 
as «the work of literary critics and theorists vitally interested in cognitive 
science and neuroscience, and therefore with a lot to say to one another, 
whatever their differences»3. Such an omnivorous definition leaves our 
problem intact: what do we mean by “cognitive”?  Needless to say, in this 
context the term cannot refer simply to the study of literature in relation to 
the workings of the human mind. Such a study enjoys a long tradition that 
goes back to classical rhetoric and to the interest in the didactic function of 
literature, as well as in the psychoanalytical and reader response traditions4. 
This traditional road is clearly distinct from our freshly-minted, intimidating 
“cognitive turn”. More likely, the discriminating factor in the above defini-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Alan Richardson, Studies in Literature and Cognition: A Field Map, in Alan Richardson and 
Ellen Spolsky (eds.), The Work of Fiction, Ashgate, Aldershot (UK), 2004, pp. 1-25, 1.	  
3 Ivi, p. 2.	  
4 See Isabel Jaén and Julien J. Simon, Introduction in Jaén and Simon (eds.) Cognitive Liter-
ary Studies. Current Themes and New Directions, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2012, pp. 
1-9, 1-2.	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tion is the explicit reference to “science” and “neuroscience” – a reference 
that stresses the relational nature of the field. Accordingly, to understand 
the import of the “cognitive turn” in literary criticism we need to attend to 
the developments in the cognitive sciences during the last half century, in 
the wake of the “cognitive revolution”, when the interdisciplinary conver-
sation between scientists and humanists of which cognitive literary criticism 
is a quintessential example began to take shape. 
What we currently understand by “cognitive science” is actually a mul-
tidiscipline that includes cognitive psychology, computer science (AI and 
robotics), anthropology, cognitive linguistics, neuroscience, and philosophy 
of mind. The first phase of the so-called “cognitive revolution” is conven-
tionally located in the 1950s, following Noam Chomsky’s generative lin-
guistics and the work of computer scientists, mainly on artificial intelli-
gence. While this first phase is in many respects diametrically opposed to 
the current trends in cognitive science, it is nonetheless crucial for at least 
two cumulative reasons. First, it challenged the predominant behaviourism, 
with the idea that not only observable behaviours but also their underpin-
ning cognitive processes could be scientifically studied. Second, its govern-
ing metaphor (the mind as a computer or as a machine) as well as the belief 
in a universal, innate linguistic capacity brought about a renewed interest in 
the cognitive processes of the human mind/brain. 
Paradoxically, our current use of the term “cognitive” departs from this 
initial “cognitivism”, a reserved lane used mainly by first-generation cogni-
tive scientists that focus on the mental processes of a computational mind5. 
While the lane is still in use, in its more widespread sense the term “cogni-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The term “cognitivism” is sometimes used as a synonym with “cognitive” even today 
and even by practitioners who endorse the notion of the embodied mind, like Patrick 
Colm Hogan. In this sense, the editors of a recent collection on cognitive narrative stud-
ies define “cognitivist” as «the term we use in a strict sense for those forms of inquiry 
that focus not on the reader’s subjective experience but on the mental operations re-
quired to comprehend narratives.» (Bernaerts et al., Introduction cit., p. 8). While this use 
of the term seems widely accepted, I will use “cognitivism” to refer to the first stage of 
the cognitive revolution, to oppose the “computational mind” to the embodied mind. 
For more on cognitivism, see Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosh, The 
Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachu-
setts), 1993, pp. 7ff and 34-57.	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tive science” is today inextricably linked to the concept of the “embodied 
mind” as emerging from the so-called “second cognitive revolution”6. The 
logical model of the mind that first-generation cognitive scientists posited 
proved unable to fully account for the complex ways in which human be-
ings interact with the environment. The adherents of the “brain in a vat” 
argument were thus gradually forced to yield the way to the upcoming pro-
ponents of an embodied mind/brain deeply embedded in the environment 
that were arriving from converging roads.  Starting from the 1980s, a num-
ber of researchers from different fields have been proposing and modulat-
ing the notion of “situated cognition”, an umbrella term that shelters varied 
notions of embodied, embedded and extended cognition.  During the last 
two decades of the twentieth century, the work of linguists like George 
Lakoff, philosophers like Mark Johnson and Evan Thompson, psycholo-
gists like Eleanor Rosch and Lawrence Barsalou, and neuroscientists like 
Antonio Damasio7 yielded some of the basic tenets of the new, embodied 
approach to the human mind. Cognition is now seen as embodied (i.e. 
shaped by the body) and embedded (i.e. in its interactions with the natural 
and social environment)8. The mind is also understood as “enactive”, a 
term that challenges the cognitivist assumption that «cognition consists of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For an excellent overview of the transition between the first and the second phase of 
the “cognitive revolution”, see Mary Thomas Crane and Alan Richardson, Literary Stud-
ies and Cognitive Science: Toward a New Interdisciplinarity, “Mosaic”(Winnipeg) 32, 2, June 
1999, p. 123.	  
7 Foundational texts include: George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980 and Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind 
and Its Challenge to Western Thought, Basic Books, New York, 1999; Mark Johnson, The 
Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1987; Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, The Em-
bodied Mind cit.; Lawrence Barsalou, Perceptual Symbol Systems, “Behavioral and Brain Sci-
ences”, 22, 1999, p. 577-660; Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, and the 
Human Brain, Avon, New York, 1994, and The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion 
in the Making of Consciousness, Harcourt, New York, 1999.	  
8 In a fascinating and unexpected turn of the notion of embodiment, cognition is also 
seen as “extended”, reaching, that is, beyond the bodily boundaries of single organisms. 
For an introduction to the notion and components of situated cognition, see Philip 
Robbins and Murat Aydede, A Short Primer on Situated Cognition, in Philip Robbins and 
Murat Aydede (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 3-10.	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the representation of a world that is independent of our perceptual and 
cognitive capacities»9 and emphasizes the active, shaping role of the human 
mind according to the affordances for possible action that the environment 
provides. Whereas classic cognitivism conceives of cognition as symbolic, 
amodal mental representation (that translates sensory experience into an 
abstract, propositional language in order to be processed), current views of 
the embodied mind focus on the sensorimotor basis of cognition, which is 
conceived of as a modal form of representation: we quite literally think 
with our senses and our bodies. Moreover, the focus on the body as a 
whole, including the sensory organs, musculoskeletal system and peripheral 
nervous system, in addition to the brain, reassesses the role of perception, 
emotion and affect in “intellectual” cognition.  
Research on embodied or “situated” cognition has continued at an in-
creasing pace well into the twenty-first century, aided by the new and ever-
developing neuroimaging technologies10. Many recent neuroscientific stud-
ies are supporting and nuancing the mainstays of embodied cognition. 
However cognitive (neuro)science still has its ragged edges. Neuroscientists 
are far from having a clear picture of the human mind, and there is still de-
bate over a number of questions: from the modularity of the mind, to the 
propositional or modal nature of mental representation, the role of nature 
and culture in cognition, and so forth. Hardly any concept in the neurosci-
ences is settled. Not only is scientific research rapidly updating what we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Varela et al., The Embodied Mind cit., p. xx. Varela, Thompson and Rosch are the 
main proponents of the “enactive approach” to human (embodied) cognition back in 
the early 1990s – an approach that is increasingly being taken up by researchers with a 
strong commitment to embodiment, and to which I will return in the later part of this 
paper.	  
10 The recent “neuroscientific turn” has generated its own kind of anxiety, into which I 
cannot delve in this short paper. The risks of reductionism inherent in the current “neu-
roenthusiam” are evident enough, especially for the layperson. One should be careful 
enough to take brain-imaging with a grain of salt, as texts that need to be themselves in-
terpreted. However, current neuroscience is not to be intended necessarily as a “new 
phrenology”, obsessed with mapping outer phenomena into cortical regions. There is 
some of that, of course, but while neuroscience alerts to the centrality of the brain, 
many neuroscientists subscribe to the idea that “we are not our brains” but whole and 
complex perceiving and acting bodies in our environment.	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know about the mind/brain, but also different (even apparently incompati-
ble) models of mind coexist. Moreover, as neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese 
lamented as late as 2011, «[c]lassic cognitivism, like a dead star, still emits 
light»11, undercutting sometimes the strength of embodiment, and offering 
a picture of mind «more “cognitive” and/or disembodied than it needs to 
be»12. Embodied cognition is far from a unitary term. 
 
 
2. Slippery Roads and Responsible Driving  
 
Admittedly, the cognitive science and neuroscience that cognitive liter-
ary critics are «vitally interested in», as Richardson would have it, is a pretty 
slippery road. Cognitive science is in itself a multidiscipline and the cogni-
tive landscape is ever-changing, with coexisting or shifting models of mind. 
Because cognitive literary criticism is defined by its dynamic relations with 
such a fuzzy cognitive science, there might be some reasons for anxiety af-
ter all. 
One of such reasons stems from the self-proclaimed interdisciplinarity 
of the field. Indeed, many practitioners unabashedly admit that theirs is an 
approach or a stance, rather than an organic theory13. But this interdiscipli-
narity arouses suspicions, ranging from the relatively innocuous doubts 
about the very necessity of an interdisciplinary conversation between sci-
ence and literary criticism (i.e. “did we really need cognitive science to say 
that?”) to the more grave concern about the compatibility of the epistemo-
logical foundations of each discipline14. Interdisciplinarity, moreover, car-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Vittorio Gallese and Hannah Wojciehowski, How Stories Make Us Feel. Toward and Em-
bodied Narratology, “California Italian Studies”, 2,1, 2011.	  
12 Ibid.	  
13 See H. Porter Abbot, Cognitive Literary Studies: The “Second Generation”, “Poetics Today”, 
27, 4, 2006: pp. 711-722, 714.	  
14 Tony Jackson has provided an excellent analysis of the crucial issues that interdiscipli-
narity brings about to cognitive literary studies. According to Jackson, the reason why 
the academic literary establishment has not welcomed cognitive literary criticism lies 
largely on «a fundamental difficulty with this version of inter-disciplinarity» (Jackson, Is-
sues and Problems in the Blanding of Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, and Literary Study 
cit., p. 176). Jackson’s response to the cognitive turn dates back to 2002, a dawning 
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ries with it a further risk, especially when we are dealing with disciplines as 
diverse as the hard sciences and the humanities. As Alan Richardson has 
pointed out, quoting from Ellen Spolsky, one common mistake is that of 
«assuming that hypotheses presented in a field one follows as an “amateur” 
are “(somehow) more reliable than the more familiar, but embattled asser-
tions” in one’s own field»15. The danger may be not only that of a lopsided 
interdisciplinarity that simplistically plugs the vocabulary of cognitive sci-
ence into literary criticism16, but of plainly getting it wrong. Moreover, be-
cause the cognitive sciences are not a unified discipline, one should be very 
careful as to «what is and is not osmosing across the membranes dividing 
the sciences and the humanities»17. 
Sure enough, this interdisciplinary venture may entail a clear and pre-
sent danger, but nothing that cannot be avoided by responsible driving. 
The anxiety arising from a problematic interdisciplinarity might be easily 
downsized when we recognize that serious cognitive literary criticism does 
not entail the uncritical adoption of the ideas, hypotheses and methodolo-
gies of the cognitive sciences to literary criticism. To the contrary, the vast 
majority of the cognitive drivers are aware of the lack of consensus among 
cognitive scientists on many issues, of the intrinsic limitations of brain im-
aging technologies, of the dynamic and ever-shifting nature of the field they 
are in conversation with. Rather than uncritically transposing the findings 
of the cognitive sciences to literary concerns, practitioners of the field are 
increasingly engaging in a more bidirectional, full-blown interdisciplinary 
conversation that aims to bring a humanistic perspective to the kind of new 
questions that cognitive science elicits. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
stage in cognitive literary studies. In his acute analysis, Jackson himself recognizes that 
at the time cognitive critics were «still working out fundamental concepts and operating 
procedures. In fact, in the future we may well look back at these kinds of attempts as 
part of a phase or a stage on the way to a more full-blown interdisciplinarity to come» 
(Ivi, 162). With the risk of sounding overly optimistic, I would argue that Jackson’s fore-
seen future is underway.	  
15 Richardson, Studies in Literature and Cognition cit., p. 2.	  
16 Jackson, Issues and Problems in the Blanding of Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, and 
Literary Study cit., p. 173.	  
17 Gallese and Wojciehowski, How Stories Make Us Feel cit.	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However, a stubborn line of criticism toward cognitive literary criticism 
persists, unsurprisingly, when its dynamic conversation with cognitive sci-
ence is viewed, rather, as unconditioned commitment or uncritical ac-
ceptance. (I have been accused of being “bowing at the altar of science” 
myself.) Cognitive approaches to literature, so the criticism goes, reduce all 
things literary to neurobiological processes, disavowing the field’s allegiance 
to social constructivism, to historicist, cultural and ideological modes of 
analysis. The field is seen as «the most concerted challenge to theory’s rule» 
inasmuch as it represents «an attempt to put literary analysis on a more em-
pirical, scientific, physicalist footing, by adapting the tools and approaches 
of mind-embodiment science»18. Oblivious to a good amount of contrary 
evidence, the idea that cognitive literary studies deliberately «turn away 
from the historical, social and political conditions that shape the literary, 
toward the universal structures of cognition»19 is quite widespread still to-
day. 
While the charge of radical empiricism may have seemed sensible 
enough at the dawn of the cognitive turn, it loses ground once we attend to 
the epistemological stance most of cognitive critics take – and to the kind 
of work that has been done to date. Analyzing such stance in 2001, Eliza-
beth Hart admitted that, because cognitive literary studies rely on scientific 
studies «some degree of epistemological efficacy in scientific empiricism»20 
is axiomatically accepted. However, the degree of this acceptance needs to 
be modulated. On account of its underlying notion of human (embodied) 
cognition – that is believed to be neurobiologically constrained, yet also 
«environmentally situated, context-dependent and culturally indexed, i.e., 
subject to lesser or greater degrees of constructivism»21 – cognitive literary 
criticism «shifts the terms of age-old epistemological debate from a binary 
to a continuum of positions that enables, to varying degrees, a unique syn-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Paul Sheehan, Continental Drift: The Clash between Literary Theory and Cognitive Literary 
Studies, in Chris Danta and Helen Groth (eds.), Mindful Aesthetics: Literature and Science of 
Mind, Bloomsbury, London, 2014, pp. 47-58, 48.	  
19 Ivi, p. 53.	  
20 Elizabeth Hart, The Epistemology of Cognitive Literary Studies, “Philosophy and Literature” 
25, 2, 2001, pp. 314-344, 314.	  
21 Ivi, p. 326.	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thesis of realist and relativist perspectives»22. Along this epistemological 
continuum, argues Hart, varying positions might be found, closer or farther 
to either end of the spectrum, or to a true middle ground between real-
ism/essentialism and relativism/constructionism23. Now, much of this por-
tion of criticism tends to conflate (quite tendentiously) cognitive sciences 
with “cognitivism” or, more frequently, cognitive literary criticism with 
“evolutionary criticism” or “literary Darwinism”24, a relatively smaller but 
energetic group of scholars that position themselves on the real-
ist/essentialist end of the spectrum. This group, from which many cogni-
tive critics (such as Elizabeth Hart, Alan Richardson and Lisa Zunshine) 
openly differentiate themselves, sees literature as a mere biological phe-
nomenon, a by-product of evolution, and overtly disregards the role of cul-
ture in literary production25. 
In case Hart’s “epistemology of the continuum” sounded too theoreti-
cal and abstract, one would just need to attend to the work of many cogni-
tive critics that are actually, and practically, trying to reconcile cognitive ap-
proaches with “theory”. Indeed, Ellen Spolsky, one of the pioneers of the 
field, has made a long-standing case for the compatibility (even affinities) 
between post-structuralism and cognitive and evolutionary literary criti-
cism26. Stressing the “gappy” nature of human cognition and the flexibility 
of the brain, which allows for cultural and social conditioning, Spolsky ad-
vocates the new materialism of the embodied mind as a supplement, rather 
than a displacement, of cultural materialism27. More recently, Paul Arm-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ivi, p. 316.	  
23 Ivi, p. 327.	  
24 As late as 2014, in his critical view of cognitive literary studies as objectivist and re-
ductionist, Paul Sheehan, for example, repeatedly refers to the work of literary darwin-
ists such as Joseph Carroll and Brian Boyd to support his claims about the anti-
theoretical stance of cognitive literary criticism. See Sheehan, Continental Drift cit., passim.	  
25 For more on literary Darwinism, see Richardson, Studies in Literature and Cognition cit. 
12-14.	  
26 See Ellen Spolsky, Darwin and Derrida. Cognitive Literary Theory as a Species of Post-
Structuralism, in “Poetics Today”, 23, 1, pp. 43-62.	  
27 See Ellen Spolsky, Gaps in Nature. Literary Interpretation and the Modular Mind. SUNY, 
Albany, 1993. For a good discussion of her work, see Richardson, Studies in Literature and 
Cognition cit., p. 19-20.	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strong has offered a compelling reading of  «the neurobiological basis of 
aesthetic experience»28 that brings to light hitherto overlooked connections 
between the workings of the human brain and the hermeneutic circle29. 
Scholars like Patrick Colm Hogan and Suzanne Keen successfully exempli-
fy how a cognitive approach may fruitfully interact with postcolonial theo-
ry, providing new grounds from which to rethink the tension between hu-
man universals and particular cultural identities, with an emphasis on ques-
tions of empathy and emotion as emerging from postcolonial writing30. In a 
field as determined by social constructivism as disability studies, Ralph Sa-
varese’s innovative work shows how neuroscience, rather than pathologize 
cognitive difference, allows to imagine poetic language as a meeting ground 
or “neurocosmpolitan” terrain of diverse neurologies that enables the «de-
thronement of privileged neurotypicality»31. The work of these and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Paul Armstrong, How Literature Plays with the Brain. The Neuroscience of Reading and Art, 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2013, p. xiv.	  
29 Armstrong takes issue with much of the work done by cognitive literary critics so far, 
for two apparently contradictory reasons: their focus on cognitive psychology, rather 
than on neuroscience; and, their widespread disregard of phenomenology and the her-
meneutic tradition. Letting aside the extent to which his objections are sound, Arm-
strong’s book is highly informative and useful for those with an interest in neuroscience, 
inasmuch as it takes up many of the “hot” issues that neuroscience brings to bear on lit-
erary criticism (including the neuroscience of reading, top-down/bottom-up feedback 
loops, mirror neurons and social cognition).  However, his avowed purpose of revealing 
convergences (correlation rather than causality) between the structure and functioning 
of the brain, on the one hand, and the experience of reading and literary interpretation, 
on the other, ends up by providing a rather uneven interdisciplinary account that runs 
the risk of losing sight of literature.	  
30 See, for example, Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, New York, 2007 and Patrick Colm Hogan, On Being Moved. Cognition and Emotion in 
Literature and Film, in Lisa Zunshine (ed.) Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies, Johns 
Hopkins UP, Baltimore, 2010, pp. 237-256. For a more general view of the controver-
sial relationship between cognitive universals and cultural specificity, see Hogan’s semi-
nal Literary Universals, “Poetics Today” 18, 2, 1997, pp. 223-249.	  
31 Ralph Savarese and Lisa Zunshine, The Critic as Neurocosmopolite; Or, What Cognitive Ap-
proaches to Literature Can Learn from Disability Studies: Lisa Zunshine in Conversation with Ralph 
James Savarese, “Narrative”, 22, 1, 2014, pp. 17-44, p. 20. See also I Object: Autism, Empa-
thy, and the Trope of Personification, in Megan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim (eds.) Re-
thinking Empathy through Literature, Routledge, New York, 2014, pp/ 74-92; What Some 
Autistics Can Teach Us about Poetry: A Neurocosmpolitan Approach, in Lisa Zunshine (ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies, Oxford UP, Oxford, 2015.	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scholars shows how engaging with the insights of cognitive neuroscience 
does not preclude «commitment to the enduring value of explanations at 
the literary and cultural levels of analysis»32. 
I will go back to some of these issues later on. So far, I have analyzed 
some reasons for anxiety and identified some of the main dangers of the 
cognitive road, as well as the ways in which (responsible) cognitive drivers 
are addressing both anxieties and dangers. But to have a clear picture of the 
cognitive turn, we still need to see what our road looks like and, possibly, 
where it may take us, in the short and the long run. 
 
 
3. Lanes, Road Works, and Next Exits  
 
With greater or lesser success the more responsible literary drivers in 
the cognitive turn have endeavoured to supplement, rather than displace, 
the peculiar tradition of literary and cultural theory with the new material-
ism emerging from the cognitive sciences. But what these cognitive drivers 
exactly do as yet remains largely unsaid. Cognitive literary criticism is not an 
organic theory, but a stance; not a cohesive discipline, but a set of critical 
practices loosely related by a shared common interest – I hope this much is 
clear. It would therefore be preposterous to try to draw a detailed road map 
of a field famously characterized by its «fuzzy boundaries and overlapping 
memberships»33. In what follows, rather than attempting an exhaustive dia-
chronic or synchronic overview of the field34, I will sketch out some of the 
more representative trends in the field, to then track some of the new de-
velopments of the last few years that point to future directions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Richardson, Studies in Literature and Cognition cit., p. 24.	  
33 Ivi, p. 3.	  
34 A kind of work that has successfully been done in the last twenty years. In addition to 
Richardson’s “field map” (Studies in Literature and Cognition cit.), other good overviews 
may be found in: Mary T. Crane and Alan Richardson, Literary Studies and Cognitive Science 
cit.; Lisa Zunshine, Introduction. What Is Cognitive Cultural Studies, in Zunshine (ed.), Intro-
duction to Cognitive Cultural Studies cit., pp. 1-33 (see also her introductions to each part of 
the collection); Isabel Jaén and Julien Simon, An Overview of Recent Developments in Cogni-
tive Literary Studies, in Jaén and Simon (eds.), Cognitive Literary Studies cit., pp. 13-32.	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After roughly twenty to twenty-five years of activity, though, some ten-
tative outline may be essayed. The work of an increasing number of schol-
ars sharing a common interest in the cognitive sciences and coming from 
different fields has yielded a number of subfields, from cognitive rhetoric 
and poetics, to cognitive narratology and cognitive materialism and histori-
cism, to name just some of the most jammed lanes of activity. There are no 
continuous dividing lines, and most practitioners change lanes at ease. 
While bonded by their shared engagement with cognitive science, the 
marked differences among cognitive critics results in a pretty heterogene-
ous road. Cognitive critics bring to the field their own different back-
grounds (their focal literary traditions and periods, theoretical assumptions, 
methodologies) and at the same time their respective approaches to the 
cognitive sciences vary as well. 
In this multi-laned road, cognitive rhetoric and cognitive poetics were 
two of the first lanes to be opened to the traffic, under the influence of 
cognitive linguistics. Both fields draw heavily on the main assumption of 
grounded cognition: the human conceptual system is metaphorical and 
grounded on our embodied experience of the world35. However, their re-
spective agendas could hardly be more divergent. The main assumption of 
cognitive rhetoricians is the idea that the mind itself is literary36. Rather 
than peculiar to literary language, rhetorical figures and devices, from met-
aphors to “stories”, are fundamental components of everyday cognition. 
Building on concepts such as “conceptual metaphor” and “conceptual 
blending”37, cognitive rhetoricians such as Mark Turner emphasize the con-
tinuities between literary and non-literary forms expression. Conversely, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In keeping with the “conceptual metaphor theory” (See George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson, Metaphors We Live by cit.) See also Lawrence Barsalou, Grounded Cognition, “An-
nual review of Psychology”, 59, 2008, pp. 617-645.	  
36 See Mark Turner, The Literary Mind, Oxford UP, Oxford, New York, 1996.	  
37 Developed by Mark Turner and Gilles Faucconier, “conceptual integration” or 
“blending” is conceived of as a basic everyday cognitive process consisting in the inte-
gration of different mental packets of meaning (two or more schematic frames of 
knowledge, or scenarios, for instance) to create a third mental packet with new, emerg-
ing meaning. See Mark Turner, The Cognitive Study of Art, Language and Literature, “Poetics 
Today”, 23,1, 2002, pp. 9-20.	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cognitive poeticians aim to individuate the cognitive bases of literariness. 
Recasting traditional notions of “defamiliarization” and “foregrounding” in 
cognitive terms, Reuven Tsur has endeavoured to show how poetic lan-
guage evokes a “pre-categorical flow of information” that normally escapes 
conscious awareness38. Tsur’s pioneering work on the “precategorical” ele-
ments of cognition (admittedly speculative, although borrowed from 
speech researchers) was largely ignored by his near contemporaries in the 
1990s, but it has been more recently taken up by some researchers, as it will 
be seen soon. 
Another lane that has attracted a great deal of attention from an early 
stage of the cognitive turn is cognitive narratology, which has been defined 
as «the study of mind-relevant dimensions of storytelling practices wherev-
er – and by whatever means – those practices occur»39. Again, this is too an 
omnivorous definition – it will be more productive to see what cognitive 
narratologists actually do. David Herman, one of the leading practitioners 
of the field, describes cognitive approaches to narratology as “postclassical” 
approaches «that build on the work of classical, structuralist narratologists 
but supplement that work with concepts and methods that were unavaila-
ble to story analysts such as Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette, A.J. Greimas, 
and Tzvetan Todorov during the heyday of the structuralist revolution»40. 
Some of the issues to which “postclassical” narratologist are applying the 
concepts and methods of the cognitive sciences are: cognitive-oriented ac-
counts of narrative perspective and point of view, narrative ways of build-
ing “storyworlds”41, representations of consciousness and fictional minds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Reuven Tsur, Toward a Theory of Cognitive Poetics, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1992, 
and The Poetic Mode of Speech Revisited. What Our Ear Tells Our Mind, Keynote Lecture at 
the Symposium “Cognition and Poetics: Minding Language and Literature”, Osnabruck: 
21-24 October 2010.	  
39 Lisa Zunshine, Cognitive Narratology, in Zunshine (ed.), Introduction to Cognitive Cultural 
studies cit., pp., 151-153, 151.	  
40 David Herman, Narrative Theory after the Second Cognitive Revolution, in Zunshine (ed.), 
Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies cit., p. 155-175, 155.	  
41 According to Alan Palmer, «[s]toryworlds are possible worlds that are constructed by 
language through a performative force that is granted by cultural convention». See 
Palmer, Storyworlds and Groups, in Zunshine (ed.), Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies 
cit., pp. 176-192, 179.	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(including theory of mind, on which more later), textual and cognitive fac-
tors underlying the key effects of narrative suspense, curiosity and surprise, 
and, more recently, studies on empathy and emotion. 
Especially in its earlier stage, cognitive narratology applied notions from 
cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence – schemata, scripts, frames – 
to elucidate the cognitive processes through which readers negotiate narra-
tive texts42. The work of early cognitive narratologists such as David Her-
man was mainly concerned with building and applying models of cognitive 
processing to the study of narrative. From this point of view the work of 
cognitive narratologists seems, at least initially, to be informed by a cogni-
tivist, logical model of mind, rather than by embodied cognition, unlike 
other subfields in the cognitive turn. 
An uneven relationship with theories of embodied cognition is likewise 
discernible in literary studies on theory of mind, one of the more produc-
tive lines of inquiry, which often falls under the rubric of cognitive narra-
tology43. Theory of mind (or, “mind reading”) is our cognitive proclivity to 
read others’ outward behaviour and body language in terms of inner, unob-
servable, mental or emotional states. This evolved cognitive adaptation, Li-
sa Zunshine argues, «makes literature as we know it possible» since «litera-
ture capitalizes on and stimulates Theory of Mind mechanisms that had 
evolved to deal with real people»44. Zunshine leans heavily on the work of 
evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby to offer a fas-
cinating account of our cognitive (and emotional) involvement with fic-
tional characters and situations45. However, by thus grounding the experi-
ence of reading (and the interaction with fictional minds) on our meta-
representational cognitive proclivities, Zunshine’s and others’ readings «run 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Richardson, Studies in Literature and Cognition cit., p. 15.	  
43 Lisa Zunshine, Cognitive Narratology, in Zunshine (ed.), Introduction to Cognitive Cultural 
studies cit., p. 152.	  
44 Lisa Zunshine, Theory of Mind and Experimental Representations of Fictional Consciousness, in 
Zunshine (ed.), Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies cit., pp. 193-213, 198.	  
45 See Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel, Ohio State Uni-
versity Press, Columbus, 2006. A similar interest the cognitive bases of our involvement 
with literature is displayed by Blakey Vermeule, Why Do We Care About Literary Charac-
ters, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2010.	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the risk of reintroducing a backdoor Cartesianism to our understanding of 
literary texts, a separation of mind and body into distinct divisions and an 
implicit privileging of one over the other»46. These accounts of the reader’s 
involvement with literary characters and storyworlds seem, in sum, too 
cognitively mediated and inspired by a logical model of the mind that disre-
gards current notions of embodied cognition. 
On the other hand, cognitive narratologists and literary researchers on 
theory of mind also run the risk of being seen as mere corroborators, not 
adding anything new to literary criticism and merely offering a pseudo-
scientific explanation of our interest in narrative, and nothing more. But it 
would be in turn reductive to see the work of these scholars as a mere sci-
entific elucidation of the literary phenomenon. Sure enough, the focus on 
theory of mind emphasizes the role of cognitive universals (i.e. theory of 
mind capacities) that prompt us to «[narrativize], rightly or wrongly, the 
language of the body»47. But this by no means excludes cultural specificity. 
If reading fictional minds exploits the same cognitive abilities we use to 
read minds in everyday life, «those abilities both shape and are shaped by 
sociocultural situations»48. They are, that is, «the products of complex cul-
tural and historical factors»49, the study of which is the literary and cultural 
critic’s job – a job many cognitive critics take quite seriously. Accordingly, 
literary critics working on theory of mind (or, more broadly, on fictional 
representations of consciousness) do not lose sight of their relevant histori-
cal period: variances on strategies of literary mind-reading or on representa-
tions of fictional minds are posited as functions of cultural, historical or so-
cial change. In this sense, cognitive approaches to narrative might appeal to 
literary historians and theorists by offering a new, «more radical material-
ism»50 for the construction of subjectivity and meaning. A good example of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Gallese and Wojciehowski, How Stories Make Us Feel cit.	  
47 H. Porter Abbot, Cognitive Literary Studies cit., p. 718.	  
48 David Herman, Introduction, in David Herman (ed.), The Emergence of Mind. Representa-
tions of Consciousness in Narrative Discourse in English, University of Nebraska Press, Lin-
coln, 2011, pp. 1-40, 21.	  
49 H. Porter Abbot, Cognitive Literary Studies cit., p. 718.	  
50 In Mary Thomas Crane’s words. See Crane, Shakespeare’s Brain. Reading with Cognitive 
Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2000, p. 28.	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this historicist approach is The Emergence of Mind, edited by narratologist 
David Herman in 2011, which offers a diachronic view of the changing 
representations of consciousness in British literature, from Old English to 
the 1950s. The contributions of some of the most prominent cognitive crit-
ics (including Elizabeth Hart, Lisa Zunshine, Nicholas Dames, and Alan 
Palmer), argues Herman, «cumulatively provide a basis for investigating the 
dividing line between “cognitive universals” (…) and variable, period-
specific techniques for representing minds»51. 
After an initial phase of relative “ahistoricism”, then, the cognitive anal-
ysis of narrative is increasingly participating in a broader, transversal inter-
est in a cognitive materialism and historicism that began, roughly, in the 
first years of this century. Building on a variety of paradigms from the cog-
nitive sciences, cognitive historicism investigates the permeability between 
literary discourses and discourses about the mind in earlier cultural produc-
tions, with the theoretical assumption that «culture is an on-going interplay 
[…] between human cognitive architecture and specific historical and cul-
tural circumstances»52. The agenda of cognitive historicists is not to claim 
anachronistic anticipations of current views of human cognition in earlier 
scientific, literary and cultural productions. Rather, the application of cur-
rent theories and notions «can open up new readings of an earlier era’s lit-
erary, philosophical, and scientific discourses on mind and language (…) 
because new interests, concepts, terms and methods bring with them new 
perspectives on the historical record»53. 
Mary Thomas Crane paved the way for the deployment of cognitive 
science to offer a new perspective on an author – Shakespeare – and his 
epoch. While Crane recognizes the recent «emphasis on the importance of 
the material body in the early modern period», she also laments that «the 
body and especially the brain of the author have been signally absent from 
such studies»54. As an alternative, Crane proposes to pay attention to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 David Herman, Introduction, in Herman, The Emergence of Mind cit., p. 3.	  
52 Lisa Zunshine, Cognitive Historicism, in Zunshine (ed.), Introduction to Cognitive Cultural 
studies cit., p. 61-62.	  
53 Richardson, Studies in Literature and Cognition cit., p. 23.	  
54 Crane, Shakespeare’s Brain cit., p. 6.	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brain, as «the material site where biology engages culture to produce the 
mind and its manifestation, the text» with the aim to find «traces of a par-
ticularly fertile collaboration between the two»55. While she draws mainly 
on cognitive linguistics to find those traces of cognitive and ideological 
processes, her approach is clearly historicist, especially in her discussion of 
Hamlet. In turn, Alan Richardson has identified a number of “resonances” 
between Romantic-era and current neuroscientific developments that 
throw intriguing new light on works and themes of English Romanticism56. 
Similarly, Nicholas Dames has argued for a strong influence of the emer-
gence of 19th century materialist or physiological understanding of the 
mind/brain in Victorian literary representations of consciousness57. The 
number of literary historians that are paying attention to this material or 
physiological body (brain and nerves included), combining historical re-
search with the tenets of embodied cognition has been steadily increasing 
in the last few years, and outreaching beyond the boundaries of English lit-
erature, to which cognitive literary criticism had been largely confined58. 
This marked tendency toward an increasing historicist contextualization 
of literary relevant cognitive processes represents one of the recent and 
vigorous developments of the field, and seemingly indicates one of the di-
rections to go in our cognitive road. As does the mounting interest in cog-
nitive materialism and cultural theory, which, as hinted above, has yielded 
(and is yielding) a number of unexpected intersections, such as cognitive 
postcolonial theory, cognitive queer theory, cognitive disability studies, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ivi, p. 35.	  
56 See Alan Richardson, British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, Cambridge, 2001, and The Neural Sublime. Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts. 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2010.	  
57 See Nicholas Dames, The Physiology of the Novel. Reading, Neural Science and the Form of 
Victorian Fiction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, and The Network of Nerves, in 
David Herman (ed.) The Emergence of Mind cit., p. 215-239.	  
58 To cite just one example, Justine Murison has explored how contemporary notions 
and discoveries about the nervous system shaped cultural and political representations 
in the United States during the central decades of the 19th century. (The Politics of Anxiety 
in Nineteenth Century American Literature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011).	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cognitive ecocriticism59. These recent and promising new developments 
point to reformed or entirely new lanes of research, either fully functioning 
or in-the-making. However, in the remainder of this short guide, I would 
like to look at a different kind of development – one that, rather than with 
new lanes, has to do with the pavement of the existing road, as it were. I 
will therefore conclude this short primer with a reflection on the transversal 
and shifting concern of cognitive literary criticism with the notion of em-
bodiment. 
 From its beginnings, the field of cognitive literary studies has shown a 
rather uneven engagement with the theories of embodied or situated cogni-
tion stemming from the “second cognitive revolution”. This is of course a 
logical consequence of the relational nature of a field that is defined by its 
dynamic relationships with such a dynamic discipline as current cognitive 
science. In part because of this rapid dynamicity, in part because of the 
wide gap dividing the hard sciences and the humanities, it is understandably 
hard for literary critics to keep up with the new discoveries that are contin-
uously updating notions of human cognition. Precisely for this reason, it is 
crucial that we pay attention to the notions of cognition that critics are 
bringing to bear on literary analysis. If Vittorio Gallese and Hannah 
Wojciehowski lamented in 2011 that the lingering influence of classic cog-
nitivism might be providing literary scholars with «a model of mind more 
“cognitive” and/or disembodied than it needs to be»60, the situation might 
have changed in barely three years. Indeed, the less-cognitively mediated 
and more embodied approach to narratology (and not only) that Gallese 
and Wojciehowski (respectively, a neuroscientist and a literary critic) advo-
cated seems to be under way. In part, this resurgence of embodiment de-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Lisa Zunshine’s 2010 edited collection on Cognitive Cutural Studies includes essays 
on cognitive postcolonial theory, cognitive ecocriticism, cognitive deconstructionism 
and Neuroaesthetics (in addition to cognitive narratology and historicism). To gauge the 
potential of new intersections between theory and cognitive studies, one would just 
need to take a glance to the table of contents of the 2015 Oxford Handbook of Cognitive 
Literary Studies edited by Zunshine (cit.), that includes essays on cognitive postcolonial 
theory, cognitive queer studies, cognitive disability studies, neuroaesthetics, and empiri-
cal and qualitative studies of literature.	  
60 Gallese and Wojciehowski, How Stories Make Us Feel cit.	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rives from recent neuroscientific research, including the discovery of mirror 
neurons in macaque monkeys in the 1990s by Gallese and other members 
of the “Parma group”61. Although the existence of mirror neurons in hu-
mans remains controversial, recent studies posit the existence of complex 
sensorimotor networks in the brain that underpin our embodied simula-
tion, a basic functional mechanism of our brain that enables a direct, bodily 
access to the actions, emotions and sensations of others62. The concept of 
embodied simulation is increasingly being applied to literature, inasmuch as 
it may provide an alternative (or, a complement) to approaches based on 
theory of mind (through the mechanism so-called “Feeling of Body”63), by 
focusing on bodily and sensorimotor, rather than meta-representational, 
processes. 
More in general, recent neuroscience research has reinvigorated earlier 
notions of embodied and embedded cognition, and in particular the “enac-
tive approach” developed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch in the early 
1990s. Cognition is not reduced to conceptual, higher-order processes lo-
cated in the neocortex, but includes modal, lower-order perceptual pro-
cesses that take place in different areas of the brain and, crucially, of our 
bodies. Accordingly, literary scholars are embracing a view of cognition 
that focuses on perception, action, emotion and affect. It follows a strong 
emphasis on sensory perception, which in the enactive view is «fully inte-
grated with motor action»64. Recent neuroscience and empirical research on 
perception, imagery, and on the processing of metaphorical an literal lan-
guage opens up avenues for promising speculation on the embodied expe-
rience of reading, through embodied simulation. Besides, the focus on per-
ception brought about by recent neuroscience has rekindled interest in ear-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For more on mirror neurons, See Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia, Mirrors 
in the Brain. How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions, Oxford UP, Oxford, New York, 
2008. (Italian original, So quell che fai. Il cervello che agisce e i neuroni specchio, Raffaello Cortina 
Editore, Milano 2006.)	  
62 Gallese and Wojciehowski, How Stories Make Us Feel cit., note 19.	  
63 Ivi, passim.	  
64 Shaun Gallagher, Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition, in Philip Robbins and 
Murat Aydede (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University 
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lier studies on our perceptual system, such as James J. Gibson’s theory of 
affordances65, that stress the inextricability of perceiving, thinking and act-
ing66. On the other hand, enactive approaches to embodied cognition nego-
tiate the findings of the hard sciences with the rich phenomenology of hu-
man experience. Indeed, philosophers of mind have observed important 
connections between the innovative neuroscience of perception and the 
philosophical tradition of phenomenology67, and many humanists and liter-
ary critics with an interest in the structure of consciousness are turning to 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, and to William James’ “pragma-
tism”68. While leaning on the most innovative neuroscientific findings and 
technologies, then, literary researchers on embodied/situated cognition do 
not disavow a rich philosophical tradition in the study of our embodied ex-
perience of the world69. 
The attention to lower-level perceptual processes fostered by recent 
neuroscience in embodied cognition has also yielded a vigorous line of re-
search interested in the preconscious, pre-reflective aspects of conscious-
ness, or the “cognitive unconscious”. In this context, earlier work on cogni-
tive poetics has been revived. David Miall, for example, has taken up Reu-
ven Tsur’s notion of “precategorical information” in his empirical studies 
of readers’ response to literary texts, but also in his analysis of animistic as-
pects of Wordsworth’s writings70. Miall’s and others’ work represents an in-
creasing interest in the capacity of literary language to elicit a flow of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See James Jerome Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Cornell Universi-
ty Press, Ithaca, 1979.	  
66 Philosopher Alvar Noë has recently proposed an enactive theory of perception. See 
Noë, Action in Perception, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004. For a review of theories of per-
ception as action, see Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr, Embodiment and Cognitive Science, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005.	  
67 Armstrong speaks of the “neurophenomenologists”, How Literature Plays with the Brain 
cit., p. xii.	  
68 In his work on a perceptual theory of emotion, Jesse Prinz observes that Damasio’s 
“somatic” theory of emotion is deeply influenced by James’. See Prinnz, Gut Reactions. A 
Perceptual Theory of Emotion, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2004.	  
69 For an excellent review of this tradition, see Shaun Gallagher, Philosophical Antecedents 
of Situated Cognition cit.	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etics Today”, 32(4), 2011, pp. 693-715.	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“precategorical sensory information”, that engages the body (through the 
mirror neuron system) in «responses that are temporally prior to or at the 
border of consciousness”71. 
Neuroscience research on perception and imagery has also bolstered 
the study of literary imagination, recasting the field formerly known as 
“cognitive aesthetics of reception”72 into the more fancy label of “Neu-
roaesthetics”. Elaine Scarry’s terrific Dreaming by the Book had provided an 
innovative study on literary vivacity, proposing that, by mimicking the 
structure of perception, «great sensory writers» instruct readers to produce 
particularly vivid mental imagery. Scarry’s notion of «mimesis of percep-
tion»73 privileges perceptual processes, in keeping with recent trends, and 
her work has been the inspiration of many scholars with an interest in Neu-
roaesthetics. Gabrielle Starr, for example, openly cites Scarry in her recent, 
neuro-oriented inquiry into the aesthetic experience74. While Scarry’s study 
focused on the visual, Starr, according to current research, calls into ques-
tion the predominance of visual imagery in literary language, paying atten-
tion to different kinds of imagery (auditory, haptic, olfactory and gustatory, 
proprioceptive – i.e. related to the position of our bodies) and to multisen-
sory imagery (intended both as the interplay of sensory modes invoked by a 
figure of speech, and to the cross-modal texture of a poem, passage or 
work)75. In keeping with current research, Starr also places particular em-
phasis on motor imagery. Impressively conversant with neuroscience (she 
works in close collaboration with her colleagues in the neural science and 
brain imaging centers at NYU), Starr’s work is an excellent example of how 
brain-imaging technologies may enrich, rather than occlude, traditional 
forms of genuine literary analysis. 
 This renewed interest in enactive approaches to the embodied and em-
bedded mind is, I would argue, spreading over every lane of the cognitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Ivi, 701.	  
72 Richardson, Studies in Literature and Cognition cit., p. 17.	  
73 Elaine Scarry, Dreaming by the Book, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, New York, 1999, p. 28..	  
74 Gabrielle Starr, Feeling Beauty. The Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge (Massachusetts), 2013.	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road – even in the field in which the influence of classic cognitivist has 
been more deeply felt: cognitive narratology. Far from the application of 
“highly-cognitive” models, David Herman has more recently embraced an 
enactive approach to rethink the “inward turn” in modernist narratives76. 
Modernist narratives, he argues, «can be both illuminated by and help illu-
minate postcognitive accounts of the mind as inextricably embedded in 
contexts for action and interaction»77, and their «techniques for represent-
ing consciousness can be seen as an attempt to highlight how minds at one 
shape and are shaped by larger experiential environments, via the particular 
affordances or opportunities for action that those environments provide»78. 
A similar drift toward a more embodied and enactive narratology can be 
seen in some of the essays included in a very recent edited collection on 
cognitive approaches to narrative79. Leaning on Avar Noë’s enactive theory 
of perception, Marco Caracciolo foregrounds the reader’s subjectivity to 
analyze how «readers run embodied simulations of experiences they subse-
quently attribute to characters»80. In turn, Anezka Kuzmicova highlights the 
“primordial” function of language, its «capacity to make absent phenomena 
present to the senses»81, as posited by anthropologist Robin Dunbar, to in-
vestigate the ways in which the «embodied mind of the reader […] sponta-
neously responds to the sensorimotor qualities elicited by literary narra-
tive»82. Although some of this criticism remains at a rather theoretical level 
(which would undoubtedly benefit from some more detailed readings of 
particular literary texts), the move toward a more embodied model of mind 
that privileges the sensorimotor and perceptual aspects of cognition is evi-
dent. 
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4. Have a Safe and Pleasant Trip  
 
In the preceding pages I have attempted a tentative outline of the cog-
nitive road that aims to show that the cognitive turn does not necessarily 
have to be anxiety-engendering. Of course, careful driving is needed. There 
are many insidious dangers lurking beneath the appealing veneer of scien-
tific empiricism. Besides, there are too many men at work – the road is still 
in the making – and the dashed lines dividing the many lanes of this wide 
road may make driving quite dizzying. But, all in all, cognitive drivers have 
proved pretty responsible drivers. After two to three decades of activity, 
the road seems comparatively ordered and solidly paved. 
Although I have hinted at some of the possible forthcoming directions, 
the future still looks uncertain. It may be that the fuzzily divided lanes will 
gradually become more and more discrete, and that the cognitive road itself 
will declare its independence from the highroad of Humanities. More likely, 
as the history of precedent “turns” leads to believe, the cognitive turn will 
sooner or later merge onto the main road of literary criticism. Perhaps, the 
modifier “cognitive” will eventually wear off and be considered, precisely, 
as a stance. Perhaps, soon, literary and cultural critics will quite unaffectedly 
consider the materiality of the embodied mind in their analyses of the liter-
ary productions of the human mind. I think that development, too, is under 
way. 
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